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Abstract
In this paper we establish existence and uniqueness results for equilibria in sys-
tems with an inﬁnite number of agents and with local and global social interac-
tions. We also examine the structure of the equilibrium distribution and derive a
“Markov”property for the equilibrium distribution of a class of spatially homoge-
neous systems.
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1 Introduction and overview
A common problem in the social sciences is the observation of large diﬀerences
in outcomes in the absence of corresponding diﬀerences in fundamentals. To
accommodate such phenomena a model must necessarily produce a big “multi-
plier” that transforms small changes in exogenous variables into large changes
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large multipliers. In these models an agent’s behavior depends, among other
things, on choices of other agents in a reference group and/or on the expec-
tations that the agent has of the behavior of other agents. If the marginal
utility of undertaking an action increases as other agents undertake more of
the same action, a change in fundamentals has a direct eﬀect on behavior and
an indirect eﬀect that are of the same sign. If the indirect eﬀect is signiﬁ-
cant enough, we obtain a large multiplier that may explain radically diﬀerent
outcomes from slightly distinct fundamentals.
This property of models of social interactions has resulted in a large literature
that uses these models to explain economic and social behavior. Examples
include the prevalence of segregation ([31], [32]), the adoption of religions
([2]), business cycles ([6]), economic growth ([7]), the variance of crime rates
across space ([17]), technology adoption ([9]) or price ﬂuctuations in ﬁnancial
markets ([15], [22]).
These papers and much of the literature on social interactions assume very
special interaction structures. However, [18] contains existence and unique-
ness of equilibria results for a class of models of social interactions with a
ﬁnite number of agents with fairly general interaction structure. Existence
and uniqueness results have also been established for “large” systems of social
interactions where agents care only about some weighted average behavior of
all other agents; see, e.g., [4], [5], [18] or [27]. Interaction games with an in-
ﬁnite number of players in which each player interacts with a ﬁnite number
of neighbors, but interactions are otherwise general, are discussed in [29] and
[30]. Nonetheless there is a scarcity of results concerning “large” systems with
arbitrary local and global interactions.
In many examples in the literature agents care about the average behavior
throughout the population. In these cases, the analysis is more naturally done
in the context of an inﬁnity of agents. 1 In other examples an agent’s utility is
aﬀected by the choices of some particular nearby agents. In this paper we con-
sider systems with general interaction structures. Agents interact locally with
a set of other agents, their “neighbors,” and globally with the whole popula-
tion. The local interactions are expressed by the fact that an agent’s utility is
aﬀected by the choices of his neighbors. An agent’s utility also depends on the
empirical distribution of actions across the entire population, reﬂecting global
interactions. This distinction is unnecessary for ﬁnite systems, but plays an
important role in the analysis of systems with an inﬁnite number of agents.
The systems of social interactions in this paper have random interaction struc-
tures and random taste distributions. Individuals choose actions after the re-
1 Systems with an inﬁnity of agents can also be seen as limits of large ﬁnite systems.
For formal results establishing this connection see [23].
2alizations of these random variables. As in [17] or [25] an agent’s utility is a
function of the actual actions chosen by their neighbors, but here utility can
also be aﬀected by the distribution of actions throughout the population.
For systems with an inﬁnite number of agents, the question of existence of
equilibrium involves two sets of issues. The continuity of an agent’s utility
function with respect to the vector of actions by all other agents in the ap-
propriate topology requires implicitly, as we argue in Section 2, that the de-
pendence of his utility function on another agent’s action decays suﬃciently
fast as the distance to that other agent grows. When all interactions are local
the continuity of the utility functions together with the standard convexity as-
sumptions suﬃce. For inﬁnite systems in which global interactions are present
the analysis is more delicate. In fact, a good portion of this paper is dedicated
to establishing existence and uniqueness results for a class of inﬁnite systems
with both local and global interactions. If some form of spatial homogeneity
prevails, we establish suﬃcient conditions that insure the existence or unique-
ness of equilibria. These conditions restrict the inﬂuence of an agent’s choices
on the optimal decisions of other agents, and are variations on the moder-
ate social inﬂuence assumption that was used by Glaeser and Scheinkman in
[18] to establish uniqueness of equilibrium for ﬁnite systems. For some special
cases, we translate these requirements into assumptions on the utility func-
tions. A short description of our approach to the existence and uniqueness
question is given at the beginning of Subsection 4.1.
We also study the structure of the equilibrium distribution and show that if
the interactions are only local and with a maximum radius M, and all shocks
are independent and identically distributed, then the law of the equilibrium
proﬁle is Markov of order 2M, that is knowledge of the actions taken by
agents that are further than 2M away does not help predict the action of an
agent if one already knows the actions of all agents that are less than 2M
away. A simple example shows that the law of the equilibrium proﬁle is not,
in general, Markov of order M. This example shows that the distributions
of equilibrium action proﬁles is not speciﬁed by the family of individual best
response functions. Observations of the choices of agents that are not neighbors
of a can help predict the choice of action by a. For systems with both local
and global interactions one cannot hope for a Markov property. However a
Markov property holds conditional on the empirical distribution of actions.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we deﬁne formally the
systems of social interactions that we will consider. Section 3 shows that our
framework includes many well known examples in the literature. Section 4
contains the main results. The structure of the equilibria is studied in section
5. All proofs appear in appendices.
32 Systems of random social interactions
In this section we deﬁne systems of random social interactions. Each agent is
indexed by an a ∈ A, where A is a subset of the lattice Zd of d-dimensional
vectors with integer entries. An agent will choose an action xa from a common
compact and convex set of possible actions X. An action proﬁle x ∈ S := n
x = {xb}b∈A : xb ∈ X
o
is a list of actions xb for each b ∈ A. The conﬁguration
space S of all action proﬁles is equipped with the product topology, and hence
it is compact. In our model the utility function Ua of the agent a ∈ A may also
depend on the actions chosen by other agents b ∈ A. In addition, the utility
function of each agent is random, that is, it also depends on the realization of
a random variable ϑa deﬁned on a probability space (Ω,F,P). In short, agent
a’s utility is given by Ua(xa,{xb}b6=a,ϑa).
In models of social interactions, the inﬂuence of other agents’ actions appear
in at least two distinct ways. The ﬁrst is the impact of the actions of a par-
ticular set of “neighbors.” Another is through a statistic, often the average
action, of the distribution of actions of all agents. We call the former the local
component of social interactions and the latter the global component. To be
able to describe these distinct inﬂuences, and to allow for variable degrees of
inﬂuence on the utility of an agent by the choices of his neighbors, we write
ϑa = (Ja,θa), for each agent a ∈ A. The random variable θa describes a taste
shock and assumes values in a set Θ. The random variable Ja = (Ja,b)b6=a,
takes values in the set Ξ := RA\{0}. The realization of the random variable
Ja,b deﬁnes the eﬀect the choice of the neighbor b 6= a has on the utility of the
agent a ∈ A. To accommodate the global component, the utility function also
depends on the empirical distribution %(x) associated with the action proﬁle














The representation of the utility function given by equation (1) is not neces-
sarily unique, and at this point it is only useful as an interpretation of the
interaction patterns of a system. We will see later, that for inﬁnite systems,
regularity (continuity) will require that the dependency of an agent’s utility
on other agents actions decays fast enough as a function of the distance, and
so it will place some restrictions on the random variables Ja. In addition, in
the inﬁnite case, not all proﬁles have an associated empirical distribution. We




b ∈ A : J
a,b 6= 0
o
4the reference group, or the set of neighbors of the agent a. If b 6∈ N(a) then
the action of agent b inﬂuences agent a choices only through its impact on
the distribution %(x). Diﬀerent realizations of the random variables Ja may
yield diﬀerent peer groups, and so diﬀerent interaction patterns may emerge.
This makes our approach considerably more general than the usual “nearest
neighbor” and “mean ﬁeld” interaction setups studied in e.g. [5], [15], [24],
and [27].
The following example illustrate the concept of a random peer group.
Example 1 To each agent a ∈ A associate the “a-priori neighborhood”
˜ N(a) := {b ∈ A : |a − b| ≤ M} ∩ A (l ∈ N),
i.e., a set of “candidates” that the agent a may interact with. The actual peer
group N(a) of agent a is the random subset of ˜ N(a) deﬁned by
N(a) := {b ∈ A : J
a,b = 1}
where (Ja,b)b∈ ˜ N(a) are independent random variables taking the values “1” and
“0” with probability p and 1 − p respectively.
The general deﬁnition of a utility function given in equation (1) is not very
convenient for establishing the existence of an equilibrium in systems of so-
cial interactions. This is a consequence of the fact that a proof of existence
of an equilibrium typically requires continuity of the utility functions and
compactness of the conﬁguration space S. In many interesting examples, the
conﬁguration x ∈ S enters the utility function of an agent a ∈ A both through
the actions xb taken by a ﬁnite set of neighbors b ∈ N(a) and via the dis-
tribution of behavior throughout the entire population. In case of an inﬁnite
number of agents, S is compact in the product topology, but if the utility
function ua in equation (1) depends on x through the empirical distribution
%(x) in a non-trivial manner, it is not a continuous function of x. 2 In addition,
a conﬁguration x does not necessarily have an empirical distribution. To solve
these problems we apply a procedure introduced in F´ ’oellmer and Horst [14]
and Horst [21] and previously applied in [22] to study stock price ﬂuctuations
in a microstructure model for ﬁnancial markets. We separate the local and
the global impact of an action proﬁle x = {xa}a∈A ∈ S on an agent’s utility
and view the empirical distribution %(x) of individual actions associated with
x ∈ S as a parameter of the utility function. In this way we view the utility
function ua as depending on an additional argument.
2 Since the class of continuous functions f : S → R which depend only on ﬁnitely
many coordinates is dense in the space C(S) of all continuous functions on S
equipped with the topology of uniform convergence, a map f ∈ C(S) depends on an
action proﬁle x ∈ S, at least approximately, only through ﬁnitely many actions xb.
In particular, the dependence on xb has to decay fast enough as b → ∞.
5In order to make this more precise, we denote by M(X) the class of all proba-
bility measures on X. The space M(X) is compact with respect to the topol-
ogy of weak convergence. 3 In a system of social interactions, the utility func-
tion of an the agent a ∈ A is deﬁned as a map Ua : S ×M(X)×Ξ×Θ → R,
and required to be continuous in the product topology. This utility function












Notice that, in principle, there is no consistency requirement between the
x ∈ S and the “empirical distribution” % on X, and in particular it is not
necessary that we can associate an empirical distribution to the proﬁle x. In
equilibrium, we will require consistency.
We simplify our notation ﬁxing the probability space (Ω,F,P), making the
canonical choice (Ω,F,P) = ((Ξ×Θ)A,B(Ξ×Θ)A,P) where B(Ξ×Θ) denotes
the Borel σ-ﬁeld on Ξ×Θ. Once the set of agents A is ﬁxed, all variations are
coded in the probability distribution P, and we are now ready to introduce
our deﬁnition of systems of random social interactions.
Deﬁnition 2 A system of random social interactions is a vector
E = (A,P,X,(U
a)a∈A)
with the following components:
(i) A ⊂ Zd is a set of agents.
(ii) P is a probability measure on (Ω,F).
(iii) X ⊂ Rl is a common compact convex action space.
(iv) Ua : S × M(X) × Ξ × Θ → R is a measurable mapping such that (2)







is continuous and concave in xa; the utility function of agent a ∈ A.
Our notion of a random system of social interactions includes systems with
ﬁnitely many agents. There are also cases in which the utility of the agents
can be deﬁned in a continuous manner without dependence on the argument
%, the distribution of actions. If the system has a representation satisfying all










for all continuous functions f : X → R.
6conditions of Deﬁnition 2, in which the utility functions do not depend on %,
we will say that the system is purely local.
Moreover Ua(·,%,Ja,θa) is continuous on S if and only if an agent’s utility
depends continuously on the actions {xb}b6=a taken by all the other agents and
if, in addition, the dependence of Ua on the action xb taken by the agent b
decays suﬃciently fast. 4 In this sense continuity of the utility function trans-
lates into an assumption on the interaction patterns. This justiﬁes our earlier
claim that what we call the local component of interactions has to decay fast
enough. 5
It should be emphasized that for equilibrium analysis it is equivalent to use
a utility function that depends only on the action proﬁle x, or to use the
“extended” continuous utility function that involves the variables (x,%) since,
in equilibrium, we will require that % equals the empirical distribution of the
action proﬁle x.
3 Examples
In this section we show how our deﬁnition of a homogeneous random systems
of social interactions ﬁts into the frameworks analyzed in [19], [4] and [13],





the expected action associated to the measure %. In an inﬁnite system, m(%)
turns out to be the average action associated to an equilibrium action proﬁle.
3.1 Mean-ﬁeld systems
In mean ﬁeld systems the utility an agent enjoys depends on the actions taken
by other agents only through the empirical distribution of all actions - all
interactions are global. In our setup it is natural to use the following deﬁnition:










4 See Footnote 2 above.
5 The results in [29] require the stronger assumption that each agent interacts only
with a ﬁnite number of neighbors.
7Example 4 Continuous action versions of the models studied in [4] and [8]
may be viewed as mean-ﬁeld systems in the sense of Deﬁnition 3. These papers
treat systems with ﬁnitely many agents and assume that an agents’ utility















where Eaxb denotes the expectation of agent a about the behavior of agent
b ∈ A. In particular, an agents’ utility does not depend on the actions taken
by his neighbors, but only on his expectation about their behavior. Brock and
Durlauf argue in [4] that in their spatially homogeneous setup, in equilibrium,
all agents share the same expectations about the behavior of their neighbors.
This means that, in equilibrium, Eaxb = m for some m ∈ X and for all









has equilibria that contain all equilibria of the original system. Hence, for
|A| → ∞ any property that is true for equilibria of systems of random social
interactions with utilities of the form given in equation (5), holds automatically
for systems with utility functions described by equation (4).
3.2 F¨ ollmer’s model of endogenous preference formation
F¨ ollmer’s pioneering examination of Ising economies ([13]) with endogenous
preferences can be ﬁt into our description of a mean-ﬁeld system. Let Θ =






The linear form of the utility function guarantees that each agent will always
choose x ∈ {−1,1}, and as in [13] we may interpret the taste shock as deﬁning
the preference for one of two possible consumption goods. Agents are indexed
by the two dimensional integer lattice and interact with their nearest neighbor.
That is Ja,b = 1 for maxk=1,2 |ak − bk| = 1, and Ja,b = 0 otherwise. The
preferences of an agent a ∈ A depend in a random manner on the preferences of
his neighbors. More precisely, ﬁx a local speciﬁcation, i.e., a family of stochastic
kernels (πa)a∈A from Θ4 to Θ. These stochastic kernels describe the conditional
probability of an agent’s taste shock θa conditional on the taste shocks of his
four neighbors, that is πa = πa(·;{θb}b∈N(a)). F¨ ollmer calls a measure µ on
the conﬁguration space ΘA a global phase if µ is consistent with the local





8and assumes the random variable θ is distributed according to some global
phase µ. There is an interactive structure in the distribution of the random
preferences, but the utility of an agent does not depend on the actions taken
by his neighbors.
3.3 Models with local and global interaction
The next example exhibits both local and global interaction.
Example 5 This is a generalization of the model studied in [19]. Here X =
[−1,1] and the interaction pattern is as in Example 1 above. Preference shocks
are described by independent and identically distributed random variables θa




































In particular, an agent’s utility depends on the actions xb taken by his neigh-
bors b ∈ N(a) only through a suitably weighted average action, and so the
impact of an individual agents’ action on the utility of his neighbor tends to
zero as M → ∞.
The following example shows how our model can accommodate the framework
considered in [8] and [24].
Example 6 Let X = [−1,1] and N(a) = {b 6= a : |a − b| ≤ M}. The
random variables Ja,b ∈ [−1,1] and θa (a ∈ A, b ∈ N(a)) are independent and



















The random variables Ja,b specify the eﬀect of an increase in the action by
a neighbor b on the marginal utility of an agent’s a own action. In contrast
to the utility function given by equation (4), in this example the utility of an
agent depends on the actions taken by his neighbors and not on his expectation
about his neighbors actions.
94 Equilibria in systems with random social interactions
In this section we state results on existence and uniqueness of equilibria in
systems of random social interactions, present some examples and an informal
discussion of social multipliers. As usual, an equilibrium will be deﬁned as a
random conﬁguration of actions where no agent can increase his own utility
by deviating from the proposed action proﬁle. In addition, if an agent’s utility
function depends directly on the empirical distribution of actions, the empiri-
cal distribution of equilibrium actions must coincide (almost surely) with the
empirical distribution used by all agents when choosing their optimal action.
Deﬁnition 7 A random variable g(J,θ) = {ga(J,θ)}a∈A is an equilibrium for
E = (A,P,X,(Ua)a∈A) if:
(i) When E is not purely local, the empirical distribution associated with the







δga(J,θ)(·) = %(J,θ) (9)
exists almost surely for some random variable %(J,θ) ∈ M(X) along the
increasing sequence of ﬁnite sets An := [−n,n]d ∩ A ↑ A.








a) (a ∈ A).
(10)
The requirement that the empirical distribution associated with an equilib-
rium exists is not imposed on purely local systems. However, as we will see
in Theorem 19 below, in the equilibrium of some purely local systems the
empirical distribution of actions does exist.
4.1 Existence of equilibria in random systems of social interactions
In this section we present existence and uniqueness results. All proofs are
in Appendix A. If interactions are purely local, existence follows from the
assumed continuity and concavity of the utility function, and the compactness
and convexity of the action space X, via a standard ﬁxed-point argument (see
Proposition 13.) Recall however that, in the case of an inﬁnite number of
agents, the continuity of the utility functions already imposes a decay rate
on the strength of interactions. When agents interact both in a local and
in a global manner, we have the extra requirement that, in equilibrium, the
10agents’ forecast of the empirical distribution of choices must equal the actual
distribution of actions. In this instance, the question of existence is more
delicate and requires additional assumptions.
Unless some form of spatial homogeneity prevails, there is no reason to expect
that the empirical distribution associated with the equilibrium actions exists.
For this reason, when global interactions are present, we will consider only
homogeneous systems, as in Deﬁnition 8 below. In addition, homogeneous
systems can be written as “mixtures” of ergodic systems and as a consequence
the analysis of equilibria of homogeneous systems can be reduced to that of
ergodic systems (see Proposition 11.)
We separate the existence questions in two parts. First we ﬁx the global dis-
tribution of actions % that agents anticipate and look for a conﬁguration of
actions x in which each agent a is maximizing his utility at xa given the ac-
tion of all other agents {xb}b6=a, and the anticipated distribution of actions
%. We call such a conﬁguration a microscopic equilibrium. In a microscopic
equilibrium the empirical distribution of the actions xa may not even ex-
ist. A microscopic equilibrium with an anticipated global distribution %∗ is
an equilibrium if %∗ is the empirical distribution of the actions xa. Even for
non-homogeneous systems, for any given %, microscopic equilibria always ex-
ist under our assumptions and this establishes, in particular, the existence of
an equilibrium for purely local systems (Proposition 13). However this micro-
scopic equilibrium need not be spatially homogeneous even if the system of
social interactions is ergodic, and hence the empirical distribution of equilib-
rium actions may fail to exist. Proposition 15 establishes that homogeneity
follows if the microscopic equilibria is unique for a given anticipated empirical
distribution %. To establish this uniqueness we need to bound the strength
of interactions. Once the uniqueness of microscopic equilibria is guaranteed,
the same bounds on the strengths of interactions are used to show that the
microscopic equilibria vary continuously with the anticipated distribution of
actions %, and again a ﬁxed point argument is used to produce an equilibrium
for the system of social interactions.
We use two related assumptions that limit the inﬂuence of both the actions
of other agents and the anticipated empirical distribution of actions on the
choices of an agent. The ﬁrst, moderate social inﬂuence (Deﬁnition 17), must
hold for every realization of (J,θ). Moderate social interactions suﬃce for the
existence of a unique, and hence homogeneous, microscopic equilibria for any
given anticipated distribution % (Proposition 18). Theorem 19 establishes that
for ergodic systems that satisfy the moderate social inﬂuence condition, there
exists a spatially homogeneous equilibrium whose associated empirical distri-
bution is almost surely independent of the realization of the random shocks.
Furthermore, a strengthening of the moderate social inﬂuence assumption can
be used to establish uniqueness of equilibria. The second set of bounds on
11the strength of interactions, average moderate social inﬂuence (Deﬁnition 22)
must only hold in expected value. For systems with one-sided interactions (see
Deﬁnition 20) average moderate social inﬂuence suﬃces to establish existence
of equilibrium (see Proposition 23 and Theorem 24.) Again uniqueness follows
form a stronger version of the average moderate social inﬂuence assumption.
4.1.1 Homogeneous random systems
In a homogeneous random system the utilities that agents enjoy are invariant
under the simultaneous shifts of agents, their private taste shocks and inter-
action proﬁles. In particular, homogeneity rules out the existence of a single
agent that always serves as a leader for all others. To precise the notion of a ho-
mogeneous system, we recall that (Ω,F,P) denotes the canonical probability














Deﬁnition 8 E = (A,P,X,(Ua)a∈A) is homogeneous if A = Zd and:
(i) There exists a measurable mapping U : S × M(X) × Ξ × Θ → R such











(ii) The distribution of the random variable (J,θ) = {(Ja,θa)}a∈A is station-
ary, i.e,
P[(J,θ) ∈ B] = P[T
a(J,θ) ∈ B]
for all a ∈ A and for each measurable set B ∈ F.
For a homogeneous system it is natural to search for an equilibrium that also
displays homogeneity, that is where the equilibrium actions are invariant under
the simultaneous shift of agents, their private taste shocks and interaction
proﬁles.






for each a ∈ Zd. An equilibrium conﬁguration g(J,θ) is homogeneous if g(J,θ)
is an homogeneous action proﬁle.
Besides its natural appeal in the case of homogeneous systems, it turns out that
homogeneous action proﬁles guarantee the existence of empirical distributions
that is required to test the equilibrium condition given by equation (9) in
Deﬁnition 7.
124.1.2 Ergodic random systems
Homogeneous system can be written as “convex-combinations” of systems
with probability measures that are ergodic in the sense of the following deﬁ-
nition.
Deﬁnition 10 The homogeneous system E is ergodic if, in addition, the prob-
ability measure P is ergodic, that is if P satisﬁes a 0-1-law on the σ-ﬁeld of all
shift invariant events.
Ergodicity includes the case where (Ja,θa) (a ∈ A) are independent and iden-
tically distributed random variables.
Homogeneous systems of social interactions may be viewed as mixtures of
ergodic systems. Given a homogeneous system E = (A,P,X,(Ua)a∈A), there
exists a set M0 of ergodic probability measures on (Ω,F) and a mixing mea-





In addition the measures ν ∈ M0 are mutually singular: There exists (almost
surely) mutually disjoint sets Ων such that
ν(Ων) = 1 and ν(Ωˆ ν) = 0 for ν 6= ˆ ν.
The system E can thus be viewed as a mixture of ergodic systems Eν =
(A,ν,X,(Ua)a∈A), and we may think of a homogeneous system in two steps.
First nature chooses an ergodic measure ν using the mixture measure π. Sec-
ond it chooses an interaction pattern J and a vector of taste shocks θ according
to ν.
The following result shows that the equilibrium analysis of homogeneous sys-
tems can be reduced to the analysis of ergodic systems. The proof appears in
Appendix A.1.
Proposition 11 Let E be a homogeneous system of random social interactions
with an associated “ergodic decomposition” (Eν)ν∈M0.
(i) If g is a homogeneous equilibrium for E, then g coincides almost surely
with a homogeneous equilibrium gν for Eν on Ων.
(ii) If for every ν, gν is a homogeneous equilibrium for Eν, then the random
variable g given by
g(J,θ) = gν(J,θ) if (J,θ) ∈ Ων
deﬁnes a homogeneous equilibrium for E.
6 See Theorems 14.5 and 14.10 in [16] for further details.
134.1.3 Microscopic equilibria
When global interactions are present, the existence of an equilibrium for an
ergodic system can be conceptually divided in two parts. The ﬁrst part consists
of taking as given for each (J,θ) an empirical distribution of actions and asking
whether some prescribed proﬁle of actions maximizes utility of each agent
when he takes as given the actions of his neighbors and the given empirical
distribution. The second part consists in checking whether the actions assigned
to each agent generate the prescribed empirical distribution.
To separate the two problems, we introduce the notion of a microscopic equi-
librium for a system E.
Deﬁnition 12 For % ∈ M(X), an action proﬁle g(%,J,θ) = {ga(%,J,θ)}a∈A
is a microscopic equilibrium associated with % if
g







for all a ∈ A.
Thus, a microscopic equilibrium associated with % ∈ M(X) is an action proﬁle
where each agent maximizes his utility given the actions taken by all the other
agents and given the common anticipated distribution % of actions throughout
the entire system. What distinguishes a microscopic equilibrium g(%,J,θ) from
an equilibrium is the fact that the empirical distribution associated to the
conﬁguration g(%,J,θ) does not necessarily coincide with %, and may even
fail to exist. Of course, a microscopic equilibrium associated to some %∗ is an









Since %∗ is independent of (J,θ) a microscopic equilibrium will not be an
equilibrium in the sense of our Deﬁnition 7 unless the microscopic equilibrium
has an empirical distribution that is independent of (J,θ). As we will show
below this property holds for a homogeneous microscopic equilibrium of an
ergodic system.
The existence of a microscopic equilibrium for general systems of random
social interactions follows from standard arguments, but there is no guarantee
that this equilibrium is homogenous even when the system is ergodic.
Proposition 13 Let E be a system of random social interactions (not neces-
sarily homogeneous). For all % ∈ M(X) the system has a microscopic equilib-
rium g(%,·) with respect to %. In particular every purely local system E has an
equilibrium.
144.1.4 Existence and uniqueness of homogeneous microscopic equilibria
As we argued previously, it is natural to look for homogeneous equilibria in
ergodic systems. To establish the existence of a homogeneous microscopic equi-
librium in inﬁnite systems we need to place qualitative bounds on the strengths
of interactions between diﬀerent agents and on the dependence of agents’ op-
timal choices on the perceived empirical distribution of actions. We will in
fact place bounds on the reactions of an agent’s choice to changes on another
agent’s action and to the anticipated distribution of actions.
In order to simplify notation, we will assume from now on that an agent’s
utility function is strictly concave with respect to his own action. The case
where utility functions are concave, but not necessarily strictly concave, is
discussed in subsection 4.1.7 below.
Assumption 14 The utility function U in (11) is strictly concave with re-











Strict concavity of the agents’ utility functions with respect to their own ac-








aθ) (a ∈ A). (15)
This will allow us to state our weak interaction condition in terms of the best
reply functions of the “reference agent” 0.
The following lemma gives a simple suﬃcient condition for the existence of a
homogeneous microscopic equilibrium, that is a microscopic equilibrium with
a homogeneous allocation.
Lemma 15 If an ergodic system E has a unique microscopic equilibrium g(%,·)
associated with a distribution %, then g(%,·) is a homogeneous allocation.
Before we introduce the weak interaction conditions that guarantee existence
of equilibria in inﬁnite systems, we recall that the Vasserstein distance








| f : S → R Lipschitz with constant L(f)
)
induces the weak topology on M(X), and that (M(X),dV) is a compact
metric space. Here L(f) denotes the Lipschitz constant of f with respect to a
metric that induces the product topology on the conﬁguration space S. The
15next deﬁnition allows us to measure the dependence of an agent’s best reply
on another agent’s action and the anticipated distribution of actions.
Deﬁnition 16 The best reply function h0 is Lipschitz continuous if there are
random variables (La)a∈A whose sum is uniformly bounded, and a random




























dV(ˆ %, ˜ %).
Given an interaction proﬁle J and a conﬁguration of taste shocks θ, the quan-
tity La may be viewed as a bound for the inﬂuence that an action taken by the
agent a ∈ A has on the optimal choice of agent 0 ∈ A. In a similar manner,
the random variable L% measures the dependence of agents 0’s best reply on
his expectation about the population behavior.
The following assumption, Moderate Social Inﬂuence, restricts the functions
describing the optimal actions of agents and is a natural generalization of the
assumption made by Glaeser and Scheinkman in [18]. Later, in the context of
particular examples, we will derive it from restrictions on the utility functions
and interaction patterns.
Deﬁnition 17 Moderate Social Inﬂuence (MSI for short) holds for an ergodic
system E satisfying Assumption 14, if the best reply function h0 is Lipschitz




a(·) ≤ α < 1. (17)






a(·) ≤ α < 1. (18)
Inequalities (17) and (18) bound interactions across agents. MSI only involves
the sensitivity of the optimal actions with respect to the individual actions,
whereas MSI in strong form also bounds the sensitivity with respect to the
anticipated distribution of actions. Our ﬁrst result deals with existence and
uniqueness of microscopic equilibria in homogeneous systems. Examples where
Assumption 17 can be veriﬁed will be discussed in section 4.2.
Proposition 18 If E is ergodic and MSI holds, then it has a unique and hence
homogeneous microscopic equilibrium g(%,·) with respect to every empirical
distribution %.
164.1.5 Existence and uniqueness of equilibria in ergodic systems of social in-
teractions
Proposition 18 gives suﬃcient conditions for the existence of a homogeneous
microscopic equilibrium for each %. We now establish the existence of an equi-
librium in an ergodic system that satisfy our Moderate Social Inﬂuence condi-
tion. Later we will use a weaker bound to prove existence results for a restricted
class of systems of social interactions.
Theorem 19 If E is ergodic and has a homogeneous microscopic equilibrium
g(%,·) with respect to every % ∈ M(X), then:
(i) The empirical distribution associated to the equilibrium action proﬁle
g(%,·) exists, and is almost surely equal to µ[%], the distribution of the







δga(%,J,θ)(·) = µ[%] P-a.s.
(ii) If E satisﬁes MSI, then it has a homogeneous equilibrium whose associated
empirical distribution is almost surely independent of (J,θ).
(iii) If MSI holds in strong form, the equilibrium is unique.
A consequence of item (i) is that, if a homogeneous equilibrium exits for a
purely local ergodic system then this equilibrium has necessarily an empiri-
cal distribution that is independent of the realization of the taste shocks or
interaction patterns. The existence of a homogeneous equilibrium follows for
instance from MSI. Hence in purely local ergodic system where MSI prevails,
the empirical distribution of actions in equilibrium is (almost surely) indepen-
dent of the particular realization of (J,θ). Although we deﬁned equilibrium
for such systems without requiring the existence of a well deﬁned empirical
distribution of actions, if MSI prevails and the system is ergodic we could now
require, as part of the deﬁnition of equilibrium, that the empirical distribu-
tion of actions is well deﬁned and independent of both the realized interaction
pattern and the vector of taste shocks. If a system is homogeneous, but not
necessarily ergodic, then the empirical distribution of actions would vary with
(J,θ), but would be constant in each Ων, the support of the distinct ergodic
measures.
As far as we know there are no conditions on general systems of social inter-
actions other than our Moderate Social Inﬂuence assumption which guaran-
tee the existence of spatially homogeneous equilibria in random systems with
locally interacting agents. The results in this section establish that in homo-
geneous ergodic systems the existence of equilibrium is guaranteed by MSI.
Equilibrium is unique if MSI holds in strong form.
174.1.6 Existence and uniqueness in ergodic systems with one-sided interac-
tions
We now consider a class of examples where existence and uniqueness of micro-
scopic equilibria can be established under the assumption that the interaction
between diﬀerent agents is on average not too strong. To this end, we introduce
the notion of one-sided interactions.
Deﬁnition 20 An ergodic system E = (A,P,X,U) has one sided interactions
if:
(i) The random variables (Ja,θa) (a ∈ A) are distributed independently
across agents.
(ii) The interaction pattern J does not have cycles (almost surely.) That is,
for almost all realizations, if there exists a,b ∈ A and sequence a =
a0,a1,a2,...,an,an+1 = b ∈ A such that Jai−1,ai 6= 0 for i = 1,2,...,n,
then there is no sequence (bi) with b0 = b, and bn+1 = a and Jbi−1,bi 6= 0
for all i ∈ N.
Mean-ﬁeld models with independently distributed θa’s constitute a particu-
lary simple class of models with one-sided interactions. The following example
illustrates the notion of one-sided interactions in a model with local interac-
tions. More general systems with purely locally interacting agents where the
interaction structure does not admit cycles are analyzed in, e.g., [10],[11] and
[12], and in a dynamic context with forward looking agents in [3].
Example 21 Let E = (Z,P,X,U) be a homogeneous system where the ran-
dom variables (Ja,θa) (a ∈ A) are independent and where P[Ja,b = 0 for all b 6=
a + 1] = 1. Then E is a system with one-sided interactions.
Existence and uniqueness results for ergodic systems with one-sided inter-
actions can be established under a weaker bound on the strengths of social
interactions. Speciﬁcally, we will use an Average Moderate Social Inﬂuence
(AMSI) condition. While MSI must hold for every realization of interaction
patterns and taste shocks, AMSI must only hold in expected value. That is,
AMSI holds if the interaction between diﬀerent agents is on average not too
strong.
Deﬁnition 22 Let E be an ergodic system satisfying Assumption 14.
(i) Average Moderate Social Inﬂuence (AMSI for short) holds if the agents’
best reply functions are Lipschitz continuous and if the constants La can
be chosen to satisfy X
a6=0
EL
a < 1. (19)







a < 1. (20)
Again, AMSI only places bounds on the local interactions, whereas AMSI in
strong form involves the global terms. For mean-ﬁeld systems, since the utility
an individual enjoys does not depend directly on the individual actions taken
by his neighbors, we may choose La = 0 and AMSI is trivially satisﬁed.
The next result states that in models with one-sided interactions AMSI guar-
antees the existence of homogeneous microscopic equilibria.
Proposition 23 Let E be an ergodic system with one-sided interactions. If
AMSI holds, then E has a homogeneous microscopic equilibrium g(%,·) with
respect to every % ∈ M(X).
We are now ready to state the main result of this section.
Theorem 24 Let E be an ergodic system with one-sided interactions.
(i) If AMSI holds, E has a homogeneous equilibrium g(J,θ) with associated
empirical distribution almost surely independent of (J,θ).
(ii) If AMSI holds in strong form, then E has a unique equilibrium.
Remark 25 Let us consider again the mean-ﬁeld model analyzed in [4] (Ex-
ample 4). Since, in equilibrium, all agents share the same expectation about
the behavior of their neighbors, Eaxb = m for some m ∈ [−1,1]. Since the
system is mean-ﬁeld we may choose La = 0, and AMSI is trivially satisﬁed.
For mean-ﬁeld systems with independently distributed θa’s our Theorem 24
may therefore by viewed as a version of Proposition 2 in [4]. If the depen-
dence of an individual agent’s optimal action on % is suﬃciently strong, the
system may have multiple equilibria. It admits a unique equilibrium whenever
EL% < 1. Brock and Durlauf provide in [4] detailed intuition of how suﬃcient
dependence generates multiplicity of equilibrium.
4.1.7 Extension to the non-strictly concave case
In the general case where utility functions are concave but not strictly concave
with respect to own actions, our existence results apply to every homogeneous
measurable selector h = {ha}a∈A of the agents’ best reply correspondence
deﬁned by equation (15) above for some measurable selector h0 of agent 0’s
best reply correspondence. For instance, in analogy to Lemma 15, if there is a
unique microscopic equilibrium once we ﬁx a homogeneous measurable selector
h(·,%,J,θ) of the conditional best reply correspondence, then this equilibrium
is necessarily homogeneous. Also, the existence result stated in Proposition
1918 applies to any homogeneous measurable selector h of the best reply cor-
respondence. If a selector h(·,%,J,θ) satisﬁes the MSI condition, it induces
a homogeneous microscopic equilibrium with respect to any %. An analogous
modiﬁcation of Theorem 19 also holds. In particular, the existence of a homo-
geneous measurable selector of the best reply correspondence satisfying MSI
guarantees the existence of an equilibrium for an ergodic system. Similarly, for
one-sided systems, existence holds if there is a measurable selector of the best
reply correspondence satisfying AMSI. However, uniqueness is a more subtle
problem, since our results would only imply uniqueness of equilibrium once
we ﬁx a measurable selection of the best reply correspondence and, in general,
diﬀerent equilibria may result from distinct selections.
4.2 Examples of random systems with moderate social inﬂuence
In this section we give some examples that illustrate our concept of Moderate
Social Inﬂuence. If the utility functions are suﬃciently smooth, Assumptions
17 and 22 can be translated into conditions on marginal rates of substitution.
Example 26 Consider again the utility function speciﬁed in Example 5. It
is easily seen that the (Average) Moderate Social Inﬂuence Assumption holds
whenever β2 is not too large. Thus, for a small enough β2, the system has an
equilibrium. It has a unique equilibrium if, in addition, β1 is not too big.
Example 27 Consider the interaction pattern introduced in Example 1 and
set X = [−1,1]. Let m(%) =
R

















We also assume that the map (x0,m0,m) 7→ u(x0,m0,m,θ0) is twice continu-
ously diﬀerentiable with negative second derivative with respect to x0. Further





∂(x0)2 < 0 it follows that the best reply of agent 0 ∈ A is uniquely
determined. Since P[Ja = 0] = 1 for a / ∈ N(0), La = 0 whenever a / ∈ N(0).



























































≤ α < 1 P-a.s.
In this case, the system has an equilibrium. The equilibrium is unique if, for





























holds almost surely for some α < 1. If the interaction is one-sided in the sense



















 ≤ α < 1.
Let us now consider a generalization of the previous example.
Example 28 Consider again the interaction pattern described in Example 1.














Assume that the function u is twice continuously diﬀerentiable with respect to
both the actions xb taken by the agents and m(%) and that ∂2u
∂(x0)2 < 0. Using
















≤ α < 1 P-a.s.
4.3 Weak interactions and social multipliers
This section provides a rather informal discussion of social multipliers in ran-
dom systems of social interactions. We extend the analysis in [18] to systems
with a more general interaction structure and quantify the eﬀect of a change
21in an exogenous parameter p on the change in the average behavior through-
out the entire population. To simplify our analysis we focus on systems with
purely locally interacting agents.
Suppose utility functions Ua(x,J,θ,p) depend on some parameter p ∈ R,
X ⊂ R, Ua is suﬃciently smooth and strongly concave with respect to xa, and
the agents’ conditional optimal action is uniformly (on a) interior. In addition
to our Moderate Social Inﬂuence condition we assume Strategic Complemen-
tarity that is,
∂Ua(x,Ja,θa,p)
∂xa∂xb > 0. Thus, an increase in his neighbor’s action
increases an agent’s marginal utility of his own action.
As in [18] consider the mapping
F(x,J,θ,p) = x − g(x,J,θ,p)
where g(x,θ,J,p) denotes the conﬁguration of conditional best replies, given
the action proﬁle x and the triple (θ,J,p). The equilibrium action proﬁle
g(J,θ,p) solves
F(g(J,θ,p),J,θ,p) = 0.
Consider the linear operator Fx(x,θ,J,p) on RA. Moderate Social Inﬂuence
implies that this operator satisﬁes kI − Fxk < 1. Thus, by Theorem II.1.2.
in [33] the operator Fx has a unique linear inverse F −1




x = I + (I − Fx) + (I − Fx)
2 + ··· =: I + H.
Under these conditions the optimal action proﬁle is a smooth function of p,
and its derivative is given by
∂g(J,θ,p)
∂p




Strategic complementarity and moderate social inﬂuence imply that H ≥ 0.
In this sense the eﬀect on g of changes in p is an ampliﬁcation of the eﬀect
on g of the same change in p. The matrix with positive entries H gives us a
social multiplier.
5 The structure of the equilibrium distribution
In the previous section we established the existence of equilibria in homo-
geneous systems under the assumption that the social interaction between
diﬀerent agents is not too strong. The aim of the present section is to present
some results on the structure of the distribution of equilibrium action proﬁles.
22We will also use these results to contrast our notion of equilibrium with the
analogous concept used in the theory of interacting particle systems.
As a motivation let us ﬁrst assume that E is a mean-ﬁeld system in the sense
of our Deﬁnition 3 and that the taste shocks are independent and identically
distributed across agents with law ν. Let ha(θa,%) = argmaxxa U(xa,%,θa) be
the conditional optimal action of agent a ∈ A, given his private taste shock
θa and given his expectation % ∈ M(X) about the distribution of behavior








The proof of the following proposition is trivial.
Proposition 29 Let E be a random mean ﬁeld system and assume that the
taste shocks are independent and identically distributed across agents. The law







In particular, µ is uniquely determined by the distribution of an agents’ optimal
actions.
Let us now return to F¨ ollmer’s model of endogenous preference formation
described in Section 3.2. In such a situation an agent’s action reveals his taste
shock since ha({xb}b6=a,%,θa) = θa. The conditional law γa(·;{xb}|b−a|=1) of
the equilibrium action of an agent a ∈ A given the actions of his neighbors




Consider an outside observer who, in equilibrium, observes the actions of all
the agents b 6= a. In F¨ ollmer’s model it is enough to observe the actions taken
by the neighbors of a ∈ A in order to determine the distribution of this agent’s
equilibrium action. Our aim is to clarify to which extend this result carries
over to more general models. The next example shows that when there are
local interactions knowledge of a non-neighbor’s action can help predict the
action of an agent even after conditioning on the actions of all his neighbors.
As a consequence, the conditional distribution of an agents’ equilibrium action
given the choices of all the other agents does not necessarily coincide with the
law of his conditional best reply function.
Example 30 Agents are located on the one-dimensional integer lattice Z and
the utility an agent a ∈ A enjoys depends on his own action, on the actions
taken his neighbors, agent a − 1 and agent a + 1, and his private taste shock.
23The taste shocks θa (a ∈ A) are independent across agents and uniformly







a+1 − 1 + θ
a).
The system is purely local, and hence by Proposition 13 it has an equilibrium.





a) ∈ {0,1} P-a.s.










In particular, an agent a ∈ A never chooses action xa = 1 if both neighbors
b ∈ N(a) play xb = 0. Moreover, independently of his neighbors choices, the
agent a ∈ A takes the action xa = 0 whenever θa < −1. Consider now the
event
B := {θ−2 < −1, θ−1 > 0, θ0 > 0, θ1 > 0, θ2 < −1}.
The set B has positive measure, and we may with no loss of generality assume
that the equilibrium g(J,θ) = {ga(J,θ)}a∈A satisﬁes
g
±1(J,θ) = 1 and g
±2(J,θ) = 0 on B.
In fact, such an equilibrium can be obtained from any other equilibrium via a
suitable modiﬁcation. Let us denote the law of the random variable g(J,θ) by
µ. Since P[B] > 0 we also have that µ({g±1 = 1,g±2 = 0}) > 0 and so the
conditional probability µ(g0 = 1|g±1 = 1,g±2 = 0) is well deﬁned. Now recall
that µ is concentrated on a set of equilibrium action proﬁles and that the agent
a = 2 is assumed to choose action x2 = 0. Since, in equilibrium, agent a = 1
chooses xa = 1 only if agent a = 0 plays x0 = 1,
µ(x
0 = 1 | g
±1 = 1,g
±2 = 0) = 1.






0 = 1 | g
±1 = 1,g
±2 = 0) = 1.
Thus, the conditional marginal distribution of µ with respect to the actions
{xb}b6=a is not described by the stochastic kernel γa. The fact that agent 2
chose action 0 and agent 1 chose action 1 means that agent 0 must have chosen
action 1. For otherwise agent 1 would have chosen action 0. Hence knowledge
of the action chosen by agent 2, who is not a neighbor of agent 0 tells an
observer who knows the action of agent 1 something about the choice of agent
0. This is because agents 0 and 2, though not neighbors of each other, have
a common neighbor, agent 1. On the other hand, no agent at distance bigger
24than 2 from agent 0 has a common neighbor with agent 0. Hence knowledge
of the actions taken by agents that are at distance bigger than 2 from agent 0
does not help predict the action of agent 0, if the observer already knows the
actions chosen of all agents that are located at distance 1 and 2. Theorem 32
below conﬁrms that this intuition holds in general.
We have seen that in the special case of a pure mean ﬁeld interaction, the law of
the equilibrium action proﬁle is uniquely determined by the stochastic kernels
γa (a ∈ A) on X which describe the law of an agents’ optimal action. Example
30 shows that in purely local systems, the law of the equilibrium action proﬁle
need not be determined by the laws of the agents conditional optimal actions,
even if the taste shocks are independent and identically distributed across
agents. In particular, given the equilibrium actions xb of all the agents b 6= a,
the conditional distribution of agent a’s action typically does not only depend
on the actions taken by his neighbors.
The next theorem shows that the Markovian property that holds for Example
30 has a natural extension for purely local systems of social interactions with
i.i.d. shocks and where no agents has neighbors at a distance more than a
constant M. The intuition is again the same. Two agents at a distance more
than 2M are not neighbors and do not have a common neighbor. As a result,
conditional on the actions taken by all the agents at distance at most 2M from
a given agent, knowledge of the actions of agents at further distance does not
help predict that agent’s action.
Deﬁnition 31 Let E be an ergodic systems of social interactions, and let µ be
the distribution of a homogeneous equilibrium action proﬁle g. µ has a Markov
property of order N ∈ N if
µ(g
0 ∈ · | F
−0) = µ(g
0 ∈ · | FN) µ-a.s.
where F−0 and FN denote, respectively, the σ-ﬁelds generated by the random
variables {ga}a6=0 and {ga}a∈BN and
BN := {b ∈ Z




The equilibrium distribution in the model speciﬁed in Section 3.2 has a Markov
property of order 1. The following theorem states a general result about the
structure of the distribution of equilibrium action proﬁles for purely local
systems. The proof appears in Appendix B.
Theorem 32 If E is a purely local homogeneous system satisfying:
(i) There exists a constant M < ∞ such that P[Ja,b = 0] = 1 whenever
maxk=1,...,d |ak − bk| > M. That is, the utility of an agent is not aﬀected
25by actions of agents that are far enough.
(ii) The random variables (Ja,θa) are independent and identically distributed
across agents.
Then the law of a homogeneous equilibrium action proﬁle g has a Markov
property of order 2M.
For ergodic systems of social interactions where an agent’s utility depends on
both the actions taken by some neighbors and the average action throughout
the whole population, we cannot expect a Markov property. Given a homo-
geneous equilibrium g, an outside observer knows the empirical distribution
of all the agents’ states once he observes all the actions ga with a 6= 0. This
information is not available to him if he only observes the actions of a ﬁnite
number of agents. However, if the observer knows the law µ of the equilib-
rium action proﬁle, then he also knows the associated empirical distribution.
In an ergodic system the latter is almost surely given by the one dimensional
marginal distributions of µ. In this sense knowledge of µ implies knowledge
of the empirical distribution of agents’ actions in equilibrium. Thus, for mod-
els with local and global interactions, we have the following weaker Markov
property.
Corollary 33 Let E be an ergodic system that satisﬁes assumption (i) and
(ii) of Theorem 32 and let µ be the distribution of a homogeneous equilibrium
g. Then µ has the following weak Markov property of order 2M:
µ(g
0 ∈ · | F
−0,%) = µ(g
0 ∈ · | FBN,%) µ-a.s.
where % denotes the empirical distribution associated to the equilibrium action
proﬁle g.
For non-purely local systems, the assumptions of the Corollary allow depen-
dence on actions of agents that are farther than 2M, but only through the
empirical distribution of actions.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we established existence and uniqueness results for systems of
social interactions with an inﬁnite number of agents in the presence of both
local and global interactions. For purely local systems, continuity of the util-
ity functions in the appropriate topology together with the usual convexity
assumptions suﬃce. Note however that for systems with an inﬁnite number of
agents, continuity requires that the dependence of an agent’s utility on other
agents’ actions decay suﬃciently fast as the distance between agents increases.
26In the presence of global interactions existence of an equilibrium seems to
require further assumptions. We restricted our analysis to the case of spa-
tially homogeneous systems. We ﬁrst observed that we may view spatially
homogeneous systems as mixtures of ergodic systems. We may thus think of a
homogeneous system in two steps. First nature picks an ergodic system using
a distribution π. Then it chooses an interaction pattern and a taste shock
according to the distribution of the selected ergodic system.
If an ergodic system satisﬁes the assumption of moderate social interactions
(MSI) then existence of equilibrium obtains. In fact we show the existence
of an equilibrium where the empirical distribution of actions is always well
deﬁned and independent of the realized interaction pattern and taste shocks.
For homogeneous systems this implies that the equilibrium distribution of
actions only depends on the ergodic system chosen by nature. Furthermore, if
the utility functions are strictly concave on own actions, a stronger form of MSI
also delivers uniqueness of equilibrium for an ergodic system. For one-sided
systems we obtain existence from the weaker assumption of average moderate
social interactions (AMSI). Uniqueness follows if we assume strict concavity
and a stronger version of AMSI.
We also show that for purely local systems in which interactions have a max-
imum radius M, the law of the equilibrium proﬁle is Markov of order 2M.
An example shows that one cannot do better and hence that we cannot de-
scribe equilibria via a family of stochastic kernels that specify the conditional
distribution of actions by an agent, given the actions of his neighbors.
A Proof of the existence and uniqueness results
In this appendix we present the proofs of our existence and uniqueness results.
A.1 Reduction to the ergodic case
The analysis of homogeneous systems of social interactions can be reduced to the
analysis of ergodic systems.
Proof of Proposition 11: Let g be a homogeneous equilibrium for the homoge-
neous system E. The ergodic theorem implies that the empirical distribution associ-
ated to the equilibrium action proﬁle g(J,θ) exists almost surely and is, conditioned
on Ων independent of (J,θ). This shows that the random variable gν on Ων given
by
gν(J,θ) = g(J,θ) on Ων
27deﬁnes a homogeneous equilibrium for Eη. In order to show (ii) it is enough to show






Ων ∩ Ωˆ ν

 = 0.
This also follows from the ergodic theorem. 2
A.2 Existence of microscopic equilibria
Proof of Proposition 13: The utility functions are concave in the agents’ own
actions and continuous. Thus, the best reply correspondence h is upper hemi-
continuous. Since X is compact and convex, the existence of a ﬁxed point of the
map x = (xb)b∈A 7→ h(x,%,J,θ), i.e., a microscopic equilibrium associated to %,
follows from the Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg ﬁxed point theorem. 2
A.3 Equilibria in ergodic systems
This section proves existence and uniqueness results of equilibria in ergodic systems
of random social interactions. In a ﬁrst step we establish existence of homogeneous
microscopic equilibria. We then prove existence of equilibria using a ﬁxed point
argument.
A.3.1 Existence and uniqueness of homogeneous microscopic equilibria
We ﬁrst prove our existence and uniqueness result for homogeneous microscopic
equilibria for ergodic systems.
Proof of Lemma 15: Let h be the best reply function, and g(%,·) the unique
microscopic equilibrium associated to %. Then g(%,TbJ,Tbθ) = {ga(%,TbJ,Tbθ)}a∈A
and g(%,J,θ) = {ga(%,J,θ)}a∈A are the microscopic equilibrium conﬁgurations given
(TbJ,Tbθ) and (J,θ), respectively. Homogeneity of the best reply function yields
ga−b(%,J,θ) = ha−b({gc(%,J,θ)}c6=a−b,%,J,θ}) = ha({gc−b(%,J,θ)}c6=a,%,TbJ,Tbθ})
almost surely. Thus, given (TbJ,Tbθ), if player a chooses the action ga−b(%,J,θ)
then no agent has an incentive to deviate. This shows that {ga−b(%,J,θ)}a∈A is
an equilibrium action proﬁle for (TbJ,Tbθ), and so uniqueness of equilibria implies
homogeneity:
g0(%,TbJ,Tbθ) = g−b(%,J,θ) P-a.s.
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Proof of Proposition 18: Let us ﬁx % ∈ M(X) as well as an interaction pattern
J and a conﬁguration of taste shocks θ. For a given action proﬁle x ∈ S we put
h(x,%,J,θ) = {ha({xb}b6=a,%,Ja,θa)}a∈A.
The existence of microscopic equilibria with respect to % has already been estab-
lished. In order to show uniqueness of equilibria in homogeneous systems in which








Thus, by homogeneity of the best reply function, for x 6= y we have for almost all
interaction patterns and taste shocks that
max
a∈A
|ha({xb}b6=a,%,J,θ) − ha({yb}b6=a,%,J,θ)| < max
a∈A
|xa − ya|.
This shows that the map x 7→ h(x,%,J,θ) has almost surely at most one ﬁxed point.
Spatial homogeneity of the equilibrium follows from Lemma 15. 2
A.3.2 Existence and uniqueness of equilibria
This section contains the proofs of existence and uniqueness results for equilibria
in ergodic systems of social interactions. In a ﬁrst step we prove that distribution
µ[%] of an agent’s actions ga(%,·) depends in a Lipschitz continuous manner on the
perceived empirical distribution % if the interaction between diﬀerent agents is not
too strong. We then show that the map % 7→ µ[%] has a ﬁxed point.
Lemma 34 Let E be an ergodic random system and let g(%,·) be a homogeneous
microscopic equilibrium with respect to %. If Moderate Social Inﬂuence occurs, then
the map % 7→ g0(%,·) is almost surely Lipschitz continuous. That is, there exists a
constant L < ∞ such that

g0(ˆ %,·) − g0(˜ %,·)

 ≤ LdV (ˆ %, ˜ %) P-a.s. (A.1)
If MSI holds in strong form, the constant L in (A.1) is strictly less than 1.
Proof: Since {ga(%,J,θ)}a∈A is an equilibrium with respect to %, we have
ga(%,J,θ) = ha({gb(%,J,θ)}a6=b,%,J,θ).
Thus, for ˆ %, ˜ % ∈ M(X) and a ∈ A, ] on a set of full measure
29|g0(ˆ %,J,θ) − g0(˜ %,J,θ)| (A.2)
≤|h0({ga(ˆ %,J,θ)}a6=0, ˆ %,J,θ) − h0({ga(ˆ %,J,θ)}a6=0, ˜ %,J,θ)|
+|h0({ga(ˆ %,J,θ)}a6=0, ˜ %,J,θ) − h0({g0(˜ %,J,θ)}a6=0, ˜ %,J,θ)|
≤L%(θ0)dV (ˆ %, ˜ %) +
X
a6=0
La(J0,θ0)|ga(ˆ %,J,θ) − ga(˜ %,J,θ)| (A.3)
because an agent’s best reply function is Lipschitz continuous. Homogeneity of the
microscopic equilibrium yields
|g0(ˆ %,J,θ) − g0(˜ %,J,θ)|
≤L%(θ0)dV (ˆ %, ˜ %) +
X
a6=0
La(J0,θ0)|g0(ˆ %,TaJ,Taθ) − g0(˜ %,TaJ,Taθ)|,
and so




Thus, the Moderate Social Inﬂuence condition yields





dV (ˆ %, ˜ %) P-a.s.
2
We now show that the empirical distribution that obtains in a homogeneous micro-
scopic equilibrium associated with a distribution % is almost surely independent of
both the realized interaction pattern and the actual conﬁguration of taste shocks,
and that it varies continuously with % if MSI prevails.
Lemma 35 Let E be an ergodic system. Denote by g(%,·) a homogeneous micro-
scopic equilibrium associated to % ∈ M(X) and by µ[%] the law of the random
variable g0(%,·).
(i) The empirical distribution associated to the equilibrium action proﬁle g(%,J,θ)
exists and is almost surely independent of the realized interaction pattern and







δga(%,J,θ)(·) = µ[%] P-a.s.
(ii) If Moderate Social Inﬂuence holds, then the mapping % 7→ µ[%] is continuous
and has a ﬁxed-point. The ﬁxed point is unique if MSI holds in strong form.
Proof: Since the map g0(%,·) is bounded and measurable and because the sequence
of random variables {(Ja,θa)}a∈A is stationary and ergodic, our ﬁrst assertion fol-













δg0(%,TaJ,Taθ)(·) = µ[%] P-a.s.(A.4)
In order to establish (ii), we ﬁx a bounded Lipschitz continuous function f : X → R.





Thus, in view of Lemma 34 we have
dV (µ[˜ %],µ[ˆ %])≤sup
f





|g0(˜ %,J,θ) − g0(ˆ %,J,θ)|dP ≤ LdV (˜ %, ˆ %)
whenever MSI prevails. Thus, the map % 7→ µ[%] is continuous. Since (M(X),dV ) is
a compact metric space, our assertion follows from Brower’s ﬁxed point theorem. If
MSI holds in strong form, the map % 7→ µ[%] is a contraction. In this case the ﬁxed
point is unique. 2
We are now ready to prove the main results of this paper.
Proof of Theorem 19: Let g(%,·) be a homogeneous equilibrium with respect to








Thus the %∗-equilibrium action proﬁle {ga(%∗,J,θ)}a∈A is almost surely an equilib-
rium in the sense of our Deﬁnition 7. The uniqueness claim also follows from Lemma
35. 2
A.4 Equilibria in ergodic systems with one-sided interactions
This section contains the proofs of existence and uniqueness results for equilibria
in ergodic systems with one-sided interactions. We modify arguments that have
previously been applied in [3] to prove existence of equilibria in dynamic models
of social interactions. Deﬁne an operator V on the class of all bounded measurable
functions from Ω to X by
V f(J,θ) = {(V f)(J,θ)}a∈A with (V f)(J,θ) := h0  
{f(TaJ,Taθ)}a6=0,%,J0,θ0
.
Every ﬁxed point f(%,·) of V gives rise to a homogeneous equilibrium with respect
to %. Indeed, the best reply functions satisfy the homogeneity conditions
ha({xc}c6=a,%,J,θ) = h0({xc−a}c6=a,%,TaJ,Taθ).





In particular, a homogeneous conﬁguration g(%,·) is a microscopic equilibrium with
respect to % if and only if g(%,·) is a ﬁxed point of the operator V . In order to prove
Proposition 23 it is thus enough to show that V has a unique ﬁxed point. For this,
we introduce the interaction matrix ˆ L = (La,b)a,b∈A with entries La,b := Lb−a ◦ Ta.
The quantity La,b measures the dependence of the best reply of the agent a on the





b∈A ELb < 1 for all a ∈ A.
The following lemma turns out to the key to the proof of our existence and unique-
ness result for one-sided interaction.
Lemma 36 Let Ln = (L
a,b







whenever the assumption of Theorem 24 are satisﬁed.
Proof: Let E be a homogeneous system with one-sided interactions. The random
variables La,b depend on the entire interaction pattern J and on the vector of taste
shocks θ only through Ja and θa. In particular, the random variables La,b and Lc,d





for any sequence a1,a2,...,an and all n ∈ N. By homogeneity of the best reply





































Thus, the assertion follows from the AMSI assumption. 2
We now prove existence and uniqueness of homogeneous microscopic equilibria.
32Proof of Proposition 23: For any bounded measurable functions f, ˆ f our AMSI
assumption yields
|V f − V ˆ f| ≤
X
a∈A
L0,a|f ◦ Ta − ˆ f ◦ Ta| P-a.s.
By iteration we obtain





L0,aLa,b|f ◦ Ta+b − ˆ f ◦ Ta+b| P-a.s.
and for any n ∈ N




n (kfk∞ + k ˆ fk∞) P-a.s.
Thus, Lemma 36 yields
lim







(kfk∞ + k ˆ fk∞) = 0. (A.6)
This shows that the sequence {V nf}n∈N is a Cauchy sequence in L1(Ω,P). Since the
space L1(Ω,P) is complete and because of (A.6), the sequence {V nf}n∈N converges
in L1(Ω,P) to a random variable f(%,·) that does not depend on the starting point
f. Since L1-convergence implies convergence in probability, for every  > 0 there
exists N0 ∈ N such that
P
h







for all n ≥ N0. (A.7)











for all n ≥ N0. (A.8)
Combining (A.7) and (A.8) we obtain
P
hn










≥ 1 − .
Since
n










⊂{|V f(%,·) − f(%,·)| ≤ }
this shows that
P[|V f(%,·) − f(%,·)| ≤ ] ≥ 1 −  for any  > 0.
33Thus,
P[V f(%,·) = f(%,·)] = 1,
and so f(%,·) is a microscopic equilibrium. In order to establish uniqueness recall
that convergence in probability implies almost sure convergence along a suitable
subsequence. For any ﬁxed point f∗(%,·) of the operator V we can thus ﬁnd a
subsequence {nk}k∈N such that
lim
k→∞
V nkf∗(%,·) = f(%,·) P-a.s.
Since f∗(%,·) is a ﬁxed point, f∗(%,·) = V nkf∗(%,·) almost surely, and so P[f(%,·) =
f∗(%,·)] = 1. 2
The next result shows that, in a microscopic equilibrium, an agent’s actions depends,
on average, in a Lipschitz continuous manner on the perceived empirical distribution
%.
Lemma 37 Let E be an ergodic system with one-sided interactions and let g(%,·) be
a homogeneous microscopic equilibrium with respect to %. If AMSI holds, the maps
% 7→ ga(%,·) are Lipschitz continuous on average:
E|ga(ˆ %,·) − ga(˜ %,·)| = E
 g0(ˆ %,·) − g0(˜ %,·)
  ≤ LdV (ˆ %, ˜ %). (A.9)
If AMSI prevails in strong form, the constant L in (A.9) is strictly less than 1.
Proof: Homogeneity of the system E and the equilibrium g yields
E|g0(ˆ %,·) − g0(˜ %,·)| = E|ga(ˆ %,·) − ga(˜ %,·)| for all a ∈ A. (A.10)
In view of (A.3) we have





La(·)|ga(ˆ %,·) − ga(˜ %,·)|

.
Note that the random variable La depends on (J0,θ0) whereas the random variable
ga(ˆ %,·) depends on the realizations of the interaction patterns Jb and taste shocks
θb of the agents b ∈ A with whom the agent a is directly or indirectly linked. For a
system E with one-sided interactions this means that the random variables La and
ga(%,·) are independent. Thus
E|g0(ˆ %,·) − g0(˜ %,·)| ≤ EL%dV (ˆ %, ˜ %) +
X
a6=0
ELaE|ga(ˆ %,·) − ga(˜ %,·)|.
Thus, (A.10) along with our Average Moderate Social Inﬂuence condition shows
that





This proves our assertion. 2
34We are now ready to prove the main result of Section 4.1.6.
Proof of Theorem 24: Let g(%,·) be a homogeneous microscopic equilibrium. Pro-
ceeding as in the proof of Lemma 35 we can show that the empirical distribution µ[%]
associated to the actions proﬁle g(%,·) exists almost surely, that the map % 7→ µ[%]
is Lipschitz continuous (a contraction) if AMSI holds (in strong form). Existence
and uniqueness of equilibria follow as in the proof of Theorem 19. 2
B Proof of the Markov property
In this appendix we prove the Markov property of the distribution µ of an equilib-
rium action proﬁle g. For notational convenience we restrict ourselves to the case
where the agents are located on the one-dimensional integer lattice, i.e., to A = Z,
and assume a nearest neighbor interaction, i.e., M = 1 and Ja,a±1 = 1, Ja,b = 0
otherwise. The general case follows from similar considerations.
Proof of Theorem 32: For a given action proﬁle x−0 = {xa}a6=0 let
ˆ x−0 = {x−2,x−1,x+1,x+2}
be its projection on the actions taken by the agents a ∈ {−2,−1,1,2}, and for
B = {{xa}a6=0 : xa ∈ X} we put ˆ B := {ˆ x−0 : x−0 ∈ B}. We need to prove that µ
satisﬁes
µ(A | B) = µ(A | ˆ B) for any measurable A ⊂ X and all B with µ(B) > 0.
To this end, we proceed in three steps.
(i) Given a set B of possible equilibrium actions g−0 of all the other agents a 6= 0,
we have additional information about the equilibrium action x0 of the agent 0.
Since µ is concentrated on the set of all equilibrium action proﬁles, we know
that x0 must stabilize the best replies of agent 0’s neighbors for at least some




x0 ∈ X : there exists θ = {θa}a∈A such that the equilibrium
actions g−0(θ) satisfy g−0 ∈ B and g±1 = h0(θ±1,x0,g±2)
	
.
Thus, µ(A | B) = P[g0 ∈ A | g0 ∈ G(B)]. Since µ(B) > 0 implies P[g0 ∈
G(B)] > 0, Baey’s formula yields
µ(A | B) =
P





35If we only observe the actions of the agents b ∈ {−2,−1,1,2}, we have, in
principle, less information. In principle we only know that player 0’s choice
must stabilize his neighbors’ best replies given some equilibrium actions y−0




x0 ∈ X : there exists θ = {θa}a∈A such that the equilibrium
actions g−0(θ) satisfy ˆ g−0(θ) ∈ ˆ B and g±1 = h0(θ±1,x0,g±2)
o
.
By analogy to (B.1) this yields
µ(A | ˆ B) =
P[g0 ∈ A ∩ ˆ G(B)]
P[g0 ∈ ˆ G(B)]
. (B.2)
(ii) Let us denote by ν the law of the of the random variables θa and introduce
the set
H(B) := {θ = {θa}a∈A : g−0(θ) ∈ B} (B.3)
of all conﬁgurations of taste shocks which are compatible with the fact that
the equilibrium actions g−0 belong to the set B. Independence of the random






















and the following representation of the conditional probability of {g0 ∈ G(B)},
given (θ−1,θ−1):
P[g0 ∈ G(B) | θ±1]
=ν









θ = {θa}a∈A : ˆ g−0(θ) ∈ ˆ B
o
of all taste shocks θ such that, in equilibrium, the actions ˆ g−0 of the agents
a ∈ {±2,±1} belong to the set of observed equilibrium actions ˆ B. By analogy
to (B.4) and (B.5) independence of the taste shocks yields
36P[g0 ∈ ˆ G(B)]=
Z










and a representation of the conditional probability of {g0 ∈ ˆ G(B)}, given θ−1
and θ1:
P[g0 ∈ ˆ G(B) | θ±1]
=ν
h
θ0 : there exist equilibrium actions z−0 satisfying ˆ z−0 ∈ ˆ B such
that with g0 = h0(θ0,z±1) we have z±1 = h±1(θ±1,g0,z±2)

.
(iii) A pair (y−0,z−0) of equilibrium actions that satisﬁes ˆ y−0 = ˆ z−0 also satisﬁes
ha(θa,ya±1) = ha(θa,za±1) for a = -1,0,1 and any pair (θ−1,θ+1).
This shows that, given the taste shocks θ−1 and θ−1 the following sets are
equal:






θ0 : there exist equilibrium actions z−0 that satisfy ˆ z−0 ∈ ˆ B such
that with g0 = h0(θ0,z±1) we have z±1 = h±1(θ±1,g0,z±2).
	
In view of (B.4) and (B.4) this yields
P[g0 ∈ G(B)] = P[g0 ∈ ˆ G(B)].
Similar arguments can now be applied to prove that
P[g0 ∈ A ∩ G(B)] = P[g0 ∈ A ∩ ˆ G(B)],
and so the assertion follows from (B.1) and (B.2).
2
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